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A B S T R A C T 
The purpose of this paper is to detect the impact of audit committee characteristics on Lebanese 
financially distressed and non-distressed banks. Four characteristics of the audit committee are being 
examined; size, composition, frequency of meeting and financial expertise. The sample includes 54 
Lebanese banks with fiscal years-end between 2009 and 2011. The financially distressed and non-
distressed banks have been identified from bank profitability. Our Results show that the financial distress 
of banks has a significant negative relation with the meeting frequency of the audit committee. Hence, the 
evidence suggests that the meeting frequency of audit committee members is an important factor as it 
helps the audit committee to hinder the financial distress of the bank. Meeting frequency plays an 
important role to ensure audit committee effectiveness. In other words, the audit committee with frequent 
meetings is able to help audit committee members to ensure the integrity of financial reporting, to provide 
better monitoring and to review effectively the operations. The establishment decision of audit committee 
was adopted in 2008 and was modified in 2010 in Lebanese banks. Then, this study examines an actuality 
subject. Consequently, this paper represented an added value to the corporate governance in Lebanese 
banks and shows the importance of the audit committee impact on financial performance. Future studies 
concentrate on the impact of managerial dominance over the board (board composition, CEO duality and 
management ownership) on the independence of audit committee which may have an influence on bank 
performance.               
© 2014Holy Spirit University of Kaslik. Hosting by ElsevierB.V. All rights reserved.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Recently, the world has witnessed dramatic financial scandals which put 
the public to the research in corporate governance systems. Consequently, 
governments were put new regulations to enhance boards’ committees and 
to improve the efficiency of corporate governance systems. According to 
[1], the « corporate governance is not working the way it should… it is the 
failure by too many boards of directors to make the system work the way 
it should…». In this context, the boards of directors play a major role in 
management control through its committees in order to enhance corporate 
governance efficiency. According to [2], good corporate governance can 
enhance accountability relations between companies’ participants in order 
to protect stakeholder’s interests. Consequently, the board of directors 
Peer review under responsibility of Holy Spirit University of Kaslik.
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delegates to the audit committee a scope of responsibilities, such as 
overseeing company’s internal control process and company’s financial 
reporting aiming to monitor the top management, to control the system 
and to enhance corporate performance [2]. In this context, audit 
committee should assist the board of directors in effective management 
monitoring [3] with the aim to protect the interest of the shareholders. 
Under corporate governance, audit committee is responsible for financial 
reporting process, internal control structure, internal audit functions and 
external audit activities [1].  
Almost all the Middle East countries have a general corporate governance 
code. Hence, the establishment of an audit committee becomes mandatory 
in most of these countries. For example, Egyptian professional norms 
support global audit committee standards by surveying professional 
auditors' support for amendments to the current Code of Corporate 
Governance to align it with US and UK codes and regulations [4]. In 
Lebanon, corporate governance is not well developed but in the last few 
decades the government has taken some steps to make marginal 
improvements. Existing legal and regulatory requirements lack many 
important corporate governance protection codes, especially with respect 
to the composition and operation of boards’ committees. Audit committee 
is present in 14% of the companies operating in the Lebanese market, 
related to overseas groups and local companies in Beirut and suburbs [5]. 
Besides, the efficiency evaluation of the board of directors and audit 
committee as corporate governance mechanism in Lebanese company 
shows that 18 % of this committee is efficient in order to review internal 
control regulations, to supervise the internal audit activities, to evaluate 
the independence of the external auditors and to minimize companies cost. 
The establishment of an audit committee has created an important subject 
in the bank sector since early 2008. Establishing an audit committee 
becomes mandatory in Lebanese banks as per basic circular no. 118 1 
issued by the Governor of BDL2. It plays a major role in controlling the 
efficiency of internal auditors and evaluating the independence of external 
auditors. Therefore, the aim of this establishment is to strengthen the 
corporate governance of all Lebanese banks. Likewise, banking control 
commission3, which was established in 1967, plays an important role in 
monitoring and control to ensure the good governance in Lebanese banks.   
Issuing circulars concerning the establishment of audit committee in the 
Lebanese bank sector in 2008, puts the Lebanese market on the first 
serious attempt to find out the role of these committees and their impact in 
corporate governance. Accordingly, the main focus of this establishment 
is to strengthen the internal control by fighting against money laundering 
and financial crimes, to review internal control regulation, policy and 
procedures and to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness4. Currently, 
audit committee supervises the internal audit activities and evaluates the 
performance and the independence of external audit. Based on the 
 
 
 
1Basic circular no. 118 was addressed to Lebanese banks from Banque Du Liban. It 
is a copy of the basic decision No. 9956 of July 21, 2008 related to the establishment 
of audit committee.  
2 BDL (Banque Du Liban) is the central bank of Lebanon. It was established in 1963 
by the Code of Money and Credit. It is headed by the governor Riad Saleme.  
3 Banking Control Commission of Lebanon (BCCL) was established in 1967. The 
BCC’s function is to supervise banks and financial institutions. 
4Based on article 4 of Basic circular no. 118 (review note 2).   
intermediate circular no. 2535, the audit committee should assist the board 
of directors to fulfill the supervision of regulation and recommendation 
issued by the BDL as well as the banking control commission. In the basic 
circular no. 118, the BDL puts the guidelines for the establishment of the 
audit committee according to certain characteristics (size, independence, 
frequency of meeting and financial literacy of members), thus ensuring 
the good practices of corporate governance. The audit committee 
effectiveness depends on the prosperity or financial distress of companies, 
such as financially literate audit committee members increase the 
company performance and prevent its financial distress [6], [7]. This 
evidence of competence between members enhances company 
performance and reduces the likelihood of financial problems. Moreover, 
it is expected that the domination of non-executive members, helps the 
company to enhance its performance and to avoid any financial distress. 
[8] found that effective audit committee could increase the financial 
statement credibility and objectivity. Therefore, good characteristics of 
audit committee are positively associated with financial performance.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on Lebanese financially distressed and non-distressed 
banks. Loss output is one of many criteria that affected Lebanese bank 
prosperity. The problem of financial distress, being an increasing 
phenomenon among Lebanese banks after the civil war between 1990 and 
1993, contributes to an increase of loss output with 102 % [9]. During this 
period, four banks became insolvent and eleven had to resort to Central 
Bank lending [10]. Moreover, in this paper, audit committee performance 
is studied by showing the audit committee characteristic relation with 
financially and non-distressed banks. For the purpose of this paper, 
financially distressed banks consist of those under profitability problems. 
The financially non-distressed banks are the ones with a significant rate of 
profitability. It is expected that audit committee with good characteristics 
is negatively related to the financial distress of the bank. The performance 
of Lebanese bank sector has previously been examined in term of 
governance practices [11]. The paper used the impact of outside directors 
on bank performance without taking into consideration audit committee 
effectiveness. However, this paper goes beyond comparing the bank 
profitability among distressed and non-distressed banks. It examines the 
relationship between the characteristics of audit committee and the 
financial distress of these banks. In addition, it examines audit committee 
effectiveness taking into consideration their role, their objective and their 
responsibility to provide bank prosperity. This is essential to focus on 
evaluating committee effectiveness to avoid financial distress.     
The establishment decision of audit committee was adopted in 2008 and 
was modified in 2010 in Lebanese banks. Hence, this paper examines an 
actuality subject. An active audit committee has a significant impact on 
the financial performance of the banks. The Results show that the 
financial distress of banks has a significant negative relation with the 
meeting frequency of the audit committee. The following section 
discusses the literature review and hypothesis development. Then, the 
next section defines the empirical study and analyzes findings and results. 
Last section concludes the study.           
 
 
 
5Intermediary circular no. 253 was addressed to Lebanese banks from Banque Du 
Liban. It is a copy of the intermediate decision No. 10706, April 21, 2011, and the 
amending basic decision No. 9956, July 21, 2008, on the establishment of the audit 
committee.  
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
More than studies have examined the role of audit committee 
characteristics in agency relations [6], [12]. According to agency theory, a 
conflict exists between shareholders and managers. Therefore, the top 
management may take some decisions which are not for the best interest 
of shareholders [13]. In this context, there is an asymmetry of information 
between these two poles. The separation of decision management helps to 
control this asymmetry by limiting the power of the agent and preventing 
the deviation of shareholders interest [14]. Hence, the agency costs factors 
should influence the audit committee effectiveness [12]. This 
effectiveness is used to reduce such conflict [15]. Many studies examine 
the relationships between effectiveness of audit committee and entity 
performance. Mixed results were found between these two variables [6], 
[16]. Hence, [17] suggests that firms with effective audit committees have 
less earnings management. Prior studies have examined the role of audit 
committee characteristics in firm performance [18]. Results suggest that 
size of audit committee and financial experts of audit committee members 
are able to explain the behavioral practices of the voluntary disclosure of 
intellectual capital. This paper studies the relationships between audit 
committee characteristics (size, composition, frequency of meetings and 
financial literacy of members) and bank financial distress.     
 
2.1. Size of audit committee 
 
[19] indicates that large audit committees provide more monitoring 
resources of top management and quality of the financial reports. It may 
enhance the internal governance practice and improve the resources of 
internal monitoring. Prior studies found mixed results in the relationship 
between audit committee and company financial performance. Another 
research [20], finds that large audit committee improves financial 
reporting quality, as its effectiveness increases with the existence of 
experienced and knowledgeable members [21]. This is evidence that the 
right-sized committees can use their experience to help the committee in 
monitoring. On the other hand, it is found that a weak association between 
the size of audit committee and company performance [22], [23]. 
Therefore, the large audit committee loses concentration and becomes less 
participative than the smaller one. However, there is not any significant 
relationship between size of audit committee and financial distress [6].  In 
control perspective, result of prior study supports the monitoring function 
of the audit committee characteristics. [3] found that smaller boards 
monitor better than larger ones. The audit committee with small number 
of members tends to be more participative comparing to those of a larger 
size. However, larger audit committees are more efficient in monitoring 
financial reporting process [24]. This is due to the existence of 
experienced and expertise members. In Lebanon, basic circular no. 118 
issued by BDL obliges to compose at least three members in audit 
committee of Lebanese bank. Thus, our first hypothesis is developed:     
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between size of an audit 
committee and financial distress. 
 
2.2. Composition of an audit committee 
 
Audit committee composition focuses on independence aspect. It is 
defined by the ratio of non-executive and executive directors. The audit 
committee is considered independent when the domination of non-
executive directors is considered. However, executive members can 
impair the effectiveness of audit committee by influencing the decision-
making process of the board [25]. High presence of executive directors 
limits the amount of information held by board members. More than one 
method was found to reduce this information’s asymmetry. Thus, a large 
proportion of independent directors enhances management monitoring [3], 
which evidences that more independent audit committee has a high level 
of audit coverage [26]. There is evidence that more independent audit 
committees are seeking to preserve the independence of the external audit 
process. The participation of non-executive members in large proportion 
improves the audit committee independence. This enhancement of audit 
committee independence should facilitate decision and assure information 
objectivity [27]. For this reason, the audit committee should maintain the 
monitoring role delegated by the board with aim to provide better 
reliability of information. Consequently, the presence of independent 
board committees increases the capacity of corporate boards to effectively 
advise, monitor and discipline top management [28].   
Non-executive directors are considered to be an important mechanism in 
ensuring corporate accountability [29], [30]. Fully independent audit 
committee (non-executives members) is associated to outcomes, and 
expected to improve governance with more effective committee [31]. This 
clearly evidences that large proportion of independent members in audit 
committee ensures the effectiveness of strategic management decision-
making. In the same way, [32] observe that an audit committee should 
comprise a higher proportion of non-executive directors. [31] observe that 
full-independent audit committee provides a better monitoring of 
management than the existence of executive members with objective 
decision. The presence of non-executive directors in audit committee 
reduces the likelihood of financial problem [7]. Hence, the presence of 
independent directors protects the best interests of shareholders.   
Independent audit committee protects its reputation by ensuring high 
quality of financial statement [33]. Moreover, [32] find that a negative 
association between the audit committee independence and the going 
concern of financially distressed companies. In other words, they found 
that the greater the proportion of affiliated directors on the audit 
committee, the lower the likelihood the auditor will issue a going – 
concern reports. This argument provides a support of the basic circular no. 
118 issued by the BDL. This circular requires the audit committee in 
Lebanese banks to be including not less than three members fully 
independent; i.e. non-executive directors. Thus, our second hypothesis is 
developed:    
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between the composition 
of non-executive directors in audit committee and financial distress. 
 
2.3. Frequency of meetings 
 
Prior studies directly address to frequency of meetings and most of them 
measure audit committee activity [7], [34], [35]. Findings suggest that 
frequent meetings in audit committee provide a better monitoring of 
financial environment and reduce financial reporting problems. By 
meeting regularly, audit committee provides its effectiveness and ensures 
the integrity of financial reporting process [7]. High percentage of 
companies with non financial reporting problems held meeting four times 
a year. This finding provides that audit committees in companies with 
financial reporting problem, do not hold frequent meetings compared with 
audit committees in companies with no financial reporting problems. 
Hence, prior research found a positive relationship between frequency 
meetings and audit committee effectiveness [34], [36]. These results 
provide an evidence to support the BDL basic circular no. 118 which 
requires the audit committee of Lebanese banks to, at least, convene on a 
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quarterly basis, or when necessary. As a result, it may request to meet 
with any of the bank’s directors to enquire any work-related issue and 
shall directly submit reports, on its work results, to the board of directors.                            
Audit committee meeting frequency plays an essential role in audit 
committee effectiveness with respect to audit and control quality [37]. 
This finding suggests that audit committee works to increase audit quality 
and to use better the system of monitoring process. Hence, the meeting 
frequency reduces any perceived audit and controls risk [38]. Several 
audit committee meetings lead for more serious steps to monitor 
management by the chairman [34]. Regular meetings between audit 
committee and internal auditors enhance the effectiveness of internal audit 
function [39]. Internal audit is responsible to report problems to audit 
committee, who, in turn, discusses and assesses the overall control 
environment with management, so that proper actions are taken [40]. 
Thus, our third hypothesis is developed: 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between the frequency of 
audit committee meeting and financial distress.   
 
2.4. Financial Literacy  
 
Financially-literate audit committee consists of members who are able to 
read and understand fundamental financial statements [2] and to evaluate 
or analyze financial information. Expertise in auditing, accounting and 
internal control, form an important factor of audit committee effectiveness 
[7]. Hence, they show that presence of certificate members on the audit 
committee (CPA) is negatively related to the financial difficulties in the 
companies. Audit committee members must be knowledgeable and well-
experienced to fulfill their responsibilities effectively with the aim to 
enhance audit committee effectiveness [41]. It is expected that audit 
committees that have financially-literate members, achieve their 
responsibilities efficiently, and optimize corporate financial performance.  
The presence of financial expert in the audit committee is negatively 
associated with the probability of aggressive earning management [42]. 
This finding supports BRC recommendations in point of view presence of 
financial expertise member’s. Consequently, the presence of financial 
expertise helps the audit committee to fulfill efficiently their 
responsibilities in internal control, internal external audit. In addition, the 
different experiences of audit committee members help to evaluate audit 
committee effectiveness [43].  
Accordingly, audit committee with members financially literate can 
reduce the financial distress companies [6], [7]. From the perspective of 
internal audit; the presence of financial experts on the audit committee 
reduces the likelihood of internal control weaknesses [44], [45], [46]. 
Financial expertise in audit committees enhances its effectiveness by 
meeting financial oversight responsibilities [47]. These findings provide 
empirical evidence to support the BDL. basic circular No. 118 which 
requires to design of at least one member with financial literacy on an 
audit committee in Lebanese bank sector.  
Hence, Lebanese bank audit committee must have at least one member 
who has modern and practical banking or financial experience in the 
accounting, the financial administration, or the auditing field. Based on 
the circular, it can be concluded that financial literacy was defined by the 
knowledge and expertise of accounting, finance and audit, with relevant 
years experience in these fields. The presence of financially-literate 
members on the audit committee would enhance and improve the internal 
control and monitoring role. They can assist the board of directors to 
complete this mission. Finally, our forth hypothesis is developed:  
H4: There is a significant negative relationship between the financial 
literacy of audit committee members and financial distress.  
3. Research Design and Methodology  
This paper studies the impact of audit committee characteristics on 
Lebanese financially distressed and non-distressed banks. In order to 
achieve this aim, a cross-sectional approach was adopted to illustrate the 
association between the audit committee characteristics and the financial 
performance of the banks.  
 
3.1. Sample 
 
The sample consists of 149 firm year of data on the banks operating in 
various Lebanese territories during the period of 2009 to 2011, and 
comprising financially distressed and financially non-distressed banks. 
The banks were considered that the lonely homogeny systems which 
adapted audit committee in Lebanon. Since some banks entered and/or 
exited over the sample period, there is an unbalanced panel data. A 
financially distressed bank is defined by the inability of a Lebanese bank 
to generate income with negative profitability position. Hence, 
profitability was used as a measure of financial distress [6]. Return on 
assets (ROA) is an accounting criterion used in measuring banks 
performance [11], [48] to differentiate the financially distressed banks (i.e. 
negative return on assets) from financially non-distressed banks (i.e. 
positive return on assets). The bank performance is examined in a proper 
way to reflect the accurate position between banks having financial 
problems and banks with financial prosperity. Financial data was collected 
from the banks’ financial statements (net income and total assets) during 
the period between 2009 and 2011, as well as the corporate governance 
guide. We conduct further investigation concerning the independence of 
audit committee members by phone meetings with the banks’ 
management.    
 
3.2 Operationalisation of variables 
 
The study uses logistic regression analyses to test the hypothesis. The 
regression model is as follows (Table 1):   
 
FD = ß1ACS + ß2ACC + ß3ACMF + ß4ACFL + εt    
Table 1 - Summary of operationalisation of variables. 
Dependent Variable   
Financial Distressed 0 = Financially non-distressed banks 
1 = Financially distressed banks 
Independent Variables  
Audit committee size The number of  audit committee members 
Audit committee 
composition 
The ratio of non-executives members 
Meeting frequency The number of meeting held per year 
Financial literacy  The number of members who have a financial 
knowledge 
Control variables  
Bank size Natural logarithm of assets 
Quality  0 = Non big 4 audit firm 
1 = Big 4 audit firm 
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Where FD, financial distress; ACS, size of audit committee; ACC, audit 
committee composition (non-executive directors); ACMF, meetings 
frequency of audit committee members; ACFL, financial literacy of audit 
committee members; BS, bank size (Natural logarithm of assets per year); 
QUALITY, audit quality (Big 4 or non-big 4).   
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics of the variables in a sample. On 
average, an audit committee consists of four members with non-executive 
ones as a majority and at least one financially literate member. The audit 
committee members hold four meetings per year. In terms of audit 
committee size, meeting frequency and financial literacy, Lebanese banks 
comply with the minimum requirement specified by the BDL. On the 
other side, the average number of audit committee composition is less 
than required by the BDL regulation.  
In details and without any exception, all banks form the audit committee 
with a minimum of three members. Furthermore, 43 out of 149 bank year 
of data show that audit committees do not totally include non-executive 
members. The other sample shows that the audit committee members are 
totally independent. 43 banks do not comply with the requirement of BDL 
to have totally independent members in the audit committee. They, on the 
contrary, comply with the international regulation [2] by insuring the 
majority of the members to be non-executive. In term of meeting 
frequency, the financially distressed banks do not meet the minimum 
frequency required by the regulation. On the other hand, non-distressed 
banks have an average of four meetings per financial year.  
Table 2 - Comparison of means and BDL requirements. 
Sample  ACS ACC ACFM ACFL 
Non - FD N 139 139 139 139 
 Mean 3.580 0.903 4.470 1.040 
 Median 3.000 1.000 4.000 1.000 
 SD 0.833 0.201 1.874 0.473 
FD N 10 10 10 10 
 Mean 3.300 0.850 2.400 1.000 
 Median 3.000 0.750 2.000 1.000 
 SD 0.483 0.120 0.843 0.471 
Total N 149 149 149 149 
 Mean 3.560 0.899 4.330 1.030 
 Median 3.000 1.000 4.000 1.000 
 SD 0.816 0.197 1.894 0.471 
Chi-
Square 
 
0.136  0.370***  0.640*** 0.068 
BDL 
Circular  
Minimum 3  1 4 times At least 1 
member  
a Significant at *0.100, **0.050, ***0.010, respectively. 
 
A lack of independence in two variables, audit committee size and audit 
committee financial literacy (Chi-Square), leads the study to exclude these 
two variables from the regression equation. Non-Parametric test (Chi-
Square), confirm that audit committee size is statistically independent 
with distressed and non-distressed banks (Sig. ˃ 0.05). In plus, we 
conclude there is significant independence in audit committee financial 
literacy with distressed and non-distressed banks since Sig. ˃ 0.05 (Table 
2). Hence, H1 and H4 are not supported.   
4.2. Results of logistic regression analysis 
 
The study uses logistic regression method to test the hypotheses. 
According to Chi-Square, the coefficient associated to the audit committee 
size and financial literacy is not significantly related to the financial 
distress in the Lebanese banks. This implies that these variables (size, 
composition and financial literacy) should be removed from the regression 
equation. Hence, H1 and H4 are not supported. 
Table 3 shows the results of the analysis. The table indicates logistic 
regression between audit committee characteristics in term of financial 
distress. In terms of control variables, bank size is included in the 
regression equation (The audit quality is removed from the equation and is 
found to have no significant relationship with financial distress). There is 
evidence that, larger companies have greater incentive to heighten audit 
committee effectiveness [49]. Hence, the bank financial performance was 
strongly influenced by the bank size [50].  
In Table 3, the meeting frequency of an audit committee has a negative 
and significant relationship with the bank financial distress (Sig. ˂ 0.05). 
Therefore, H3 is supported. In addition, findings suggest that financial 
distress is not significantly related to bank size. This result shows that 
audit committees in financially non-distressed banks are more active than 
audit committees in financially-distressed banks. This result supports [7] 
who found that by meeting regularly, audit committee provides its 
effectiveness and ensures the integrity of financial reporting process.  
Audit committee composition is insignificantly related with financial 
distress. This result supports [6] who find that audit committee 
composition is not negatively related to the probability of financial 
distress. Hence, H2 is not supported. The result (Table 3) indicates that 
financial distress is not significantly related to the bank size, suggesting 
that no effect of bank size on the probability of financial distress.  
Results suggest that the financial distress of banks is significantly related 
to the meeting frequency of audit committee members. Audit committees 
that do not hold frequent meetings, may lead the banks to lower 
performance. In case of absence of regular meetings, audit committees 
may not be able to monitor effectively and to follow the operations and 
financial matters. Hence, audit committees are not able to fulfill their 
responsibilities. The frequency of meetings is expected to enhance audit 
committee effectiveness. In corporate governance perspective, financially 
distressed banks may ensure their compliance with BDL regulation in 
terms of size, composition, frequency of meeting and members’ financial 
literacy.   
Table 3 - Result of logistic regression. 
Variables (n=149) Coefficient 
1 2 3 4 
Constant  3.562 1.912 3.873 1.264 
Size 0.498    
Composition 0.163 1.728   
Meeting frequency -1.222** -1.199** -0.949*** -0.162*** 
Financial literacy  -0.881    
Bank size -0.223 -0.156 -0.251  
Audit quality -0.150    
Cox and Snell R2 0.143 0.133 0.130 0.121 
a Significant at *0.100, **0.050, ***0.010, respectively.  
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5. Discussions and conclusion 
Audit committee establishment decision is an important determinant of 
good corporate governance in Lebanese banks. An active audit committee 
has a significant impact on the financial performance of the banks. Hence, 
audit committee effectiveness optimizes banks level performance being 
important keys in corporate governance. The effective audit committee 
helps management to enhance bank performance. This paper examines 
audit committee characteristics of Lebanese bank sector in relation to 
financial distress.  
Findings of this paper show that financial distress is significantly related 
with the meeting frequency of audit committee members. Results show 
that frequent meetings of the audit committee are able to enhance banks 
performance. Hence, the audit committee with frequent meetings is able to 
help audit committee members to fulfill their responsibilities. In other 
words, audit committee is able to ensure the integrity of financial 
reporting, to provide better monitoring and to review effectively the 
operations. However, the unavailability of individuals to hold high 
frequency of meeting poses a problem to the audit committee in order to 
fulfill their responsibility. In Lebanese banks, our finding suggests that 
audit committees in 22 of 149 bank year of data do not hold regular 
meetings per year. As a result, the rule of the BDL is approximately 
implemented and the availability of time is a critical condition on the 
appointment of audit committee members. To comply with the BDL 
requirement, the audit committee members should be available minimum 
once a quarter.               
Results indicate that there is no significant relationship between financial 
distress and the other three independent variables; size, composition and 
financial literacy of an audit committee. Hence, on average, the Lebanese 
banks meet the minimum requirements of BDL in terms of size, 
composition and financial literacy. This is clear evidence that Lebanese 
banks comply with regulation to prevent any punitive action taken by the 
BDL and BCCL. However, complying with these requirements is not 
enough to enhance banks performance. Other qualitative factors have 
influence on audit committee performance [6] such as quality of 
discussion during meetings, level of commitment of audit committee 
members and organizational work environment.         
Hence, our findings support the previous studies which have examined the 
relation between audit committee characteristics and financial distress 
particularly size, independence, meeting frequency and financial literacy 
[6], [7]. Prior studies have examined the role of audit committee in 
limiting the power of management and protecting shareholders’ interests 
[14], [25]. Hence, the board of directors is responsible to establish an 
effective audit committee with standard characteristics with aim to 
guarantee their independence from management. In this way, the audit 
committee can fulfill their responsibilities without any pressure from 
management and enhance corporate governance practices. Any lack of 
audit committee characteristics can hinder the banks to overcome their 
financial difficulties. Findings of this paper show a non significant 
relationship between the banks size and their financial distress. This 
suggests that non importance of bank size to enhance bank financial 
performance. In general, this research studies the corporate governance 
with respect to audit committee characteristics and other factors such as 
audit quality and bank size. Findings suggest that audit committee has a 
significant role in enhancing bank performance and hindering the 
financial distress. Overall, meeting frequency plays an important role to 
ensure audit committee effectiveness. The banks should promote the 
effectiveness of audit committee meeting by putting these significant 
issues in their agenda.   
This study has a number of limitations. First, this paper studies only 
Lebanese banks on financially distressed or non-distressed situation. The 
result may not be generalized to other companies (financially distressed or 
non-financially distressed) which used audit committee. Moreover, in 
Lebanon, there is a small number of banks and this may affect the results 
analysis of statistic data. The implication of this study is this paper does 
not take into consideration the determinants of audit committee 
characteristics which may have an influence on bank performance. In 
other word, the degree of control exercised by management may affect the 
independence of audit committee over the board of directors and limit the 
audit committee to fulfill its responsibilities such as reliability of financial 
statement and efficiency of external and internal audit. In this way, the 
determinants of audit committee independence may have an influence on 
bank performance. Hence, the audit committee should tries to limit itself 
from being an instrument of management. Future studies concentrate on 
the impact of managerial dominance over the board (board composition, 
CEO duality and management ownership) on the independence of audit 
committee.              
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